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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
BRANDON ROWLEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20070489-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in denying Rowley's motion to suppress evidence 
obtained as a result of a warrantless search of his vehicle. This issue presents a non-
deferential, correctness standard of review. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, |15, 103 P.3d 
699. See also, State v. Duran, 2007 UT 23, ^ f 5, 156 P.3d 795, State v. Peterson, 2005 
UT17,Tf8, 110P.3d699. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of all relevant statutory and constitutional provisions is set forth in the 
Addenda. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Brandon Rowley appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Honorable Steven L. Hansen, Fourth District Court, after the entry of a conditional plea 
to possession of a controlled substance, a second degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Brandon Rowley was charged by Information filed in Fourth District Court on 
June 7, 2006 with possession of methamphetamine in a drug free zone, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); and possession of drug 
paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 58-37a-5a (R. 7-6). A preliminary hearing was conducted before the 
Honorable Steven L. Hansen on July 18, 2006 (R. 25-24, 27). At the close of the hearing, 
Rowley was bound over for trial on both charges upon a finding of probable cause (R. 25, 
27: 19). 
On November 16, 2006 Rowley filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a 
result of an illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution (R. 50-43). Oral 
arguments were heard on the motion on March 13, 2007, and the trial court denied the 
motion (R. 78-77, 80). Written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order were filed 
on April 4, 2007 (R. 86-83). 
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On April 24, 2007 Rowley entered a conditional plea to possession of a controlled 
substance, a second degree felony (R. 95, 104-03, 113). 
On May 3, 2007 Rowley filed an application for certificate of probable cause 
asking that his sentence be stayed pending appeal (R. 106). 
On May 15, 2007 Rowley was sentenced to 1-15 years in the Utah State Prison. 
Execution of the sentence was stayed pending the outcome on appeal (R. 109-08, 110). 
On June 13, 2007 Rowley filed a notice of appeal in Fourth District Court (R. 
111). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A, Testimony of Dudley Rowley 
Dudley Rowley is Brandon Kyle Rowley's father (R. 27: 4). He called Officer 
Provstgaard in May of 2006 and told him about some items that had been found in a 
Chevrolet S-10 truck Brandon was driving (R. 27: 5). Brandon had borrowed a thousand 
dollars from his parents and purchased the truck (R. 27: 6). According to Dudley, 
Brandon had a bill of sale for the truck, but it had not been registered, and there was no 
title in his name (R. 27: 6). However, Dudley acknowledged that it was Brandon's 
vehicle (R. 27: 7). 
Dudley was in possession of the truck because Brandon's mother had called his 
parole officer to have him picked up, and his truck was parked in front of their home (R. 
27: 5). As Brandon was arrested, he asked his parents to take care of some items in the 
back of the truck (R. 27: 5). Dudley does not believe the truck was locked (R. 27: 7). 
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Brandon did not request that his parents move the truck, only that they take care of what 
was in the truck bed (R. 27: 7). Dudley testified that there were items in the back that he 
could not carry and that the only way he could take care of Brandon's stuff was to move 
the truck (R. 27: 7). 
After Brandon was taken to jail, Dudley retrieved a set of keys from the bedroom 
Brandon had been staying in (R. 27: 17). Dudley subsequently amended his testimony to 
be that he was unsure whether he retrieved the keys from Brandon's bedroom or whether 
Brandon gave him a set of keys as he was taken out of the house (R. 27: 17-18). 
Regardless, he then moved his car out of the garage and put the truck in the garage to 
protect those items in the truck bed from the weather (R. 27: 5, 11). He had not driven 
the truck before (R. 27: 18). As he moved the truck he noticed a syringe with some 
substance in it, and a little porcelain cup also with a substance in it, in an open cubby hole 
approximately a foot below the dashboard (R. 27: 5-6). Dudley took the items in and 
showed them to his wife (R. 27: 6). His wife then searched the bags in the back of the 
truck and found a digital scale (R. 27: 6). 
Brandon called them from the jail and they told him about what they had found in 
the truck (R. 27: 18). Brandon didn't deny ownership but also didn't ask them to do 
anything with the items (R. 27:19). 
Ultimately Dudley and his wife put the items back in the truck and called Officer 
Provstgaard (R. 27: 7-8). 
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B. Testimony of Officer Story Provstgaard 
Story Provstgaard is employed as a deputy with the investigations division of the 
Utah County Sheriffs office (R. 27: 8-9). He received a call from Dudley and went to 
the Rowley residence (R. 27: 9). He had a prior relationship with the Rowley family as 
part of an investigation of missing checks belonging to Dudley where Brandon was the 
suspect (R. 27: 9). He had also listened to a prior phone conversation between Brandon 
and his parents at the jail where the parents confronted Brandon about drugs in the 
vehicle (R. 27: 9). Then he was contacted by Dudley to pick up those items (R. 27: 10). 
Story told Dudley to leave the items "where they were at. Whether he moved them prior 
to me showing up, I do not know. I just told them to leave the items where he found 
them, and I would come and retrieve them" (R. 27: 10). 
Story did not ask Brandon for permission to search the truck (R. 27: 11). He 
acknowledged to speaking with Donna Kelly at the Utah County Attorney's Office 
through Sergeant Brower about searching the truck and perhaps the need for a warrant 
(EL 27: 11). 
Story responded to the Rowley residence (R. 27: 10). Dudley showed him the 
paperwork regarding the truck's registration in the dining room of the residence (R. 27: 
11-12). Provstgaard retrieved a syringe just below the stereo on a little shelf type thing 
right next to the white cup (R. 27: 12). He took possession of both items (R. 27: 12). 
The small cup contained a crystal substance that field tested positive for 
methamphetamine (R. 27: 9, 10). It was sent to the Utah State Crime Lab, which verified 
that the substance was methamphetamine (R. 27: 9). 
5 
C. Testimony of Brandon Kyle Rowley 
Brandon Rowley testified that he is currently incarcerated at the Utah County Jail 
(R. 27: 14). He was booked into jail on May 24, 2006, and was still incarcerated on May 
28, 2006 (R. 27: 14). He testified that at the time of his arrest he had owned the truck for 
5-6 months, and that the truck is registered and the title is in his name (R. 27: 14-15). 
The title is kept in the truck's jockey box (R. 27: 15). 
Brandon testified that he was never asked for permission by police to search his 
truck (R. 27: 15). He also testified that although he asked his father to take care of the 
load in the rear of the truck, he did not ask him to move the truck nor did he give him the 
keys to the truck (R. 27: 15). He also testified that at the time he was arrested, the truck 
was locked (R. 27: 15). 
Brandon recalls having a conversation with his parents on the day he was booked 
into jail, however, he does not remember the substance of the conversation because he 
had taken some Xanax pills (R. 27: 16). 
D. Stipulation 
After the preliminary hearing and the filing of the motion to suppress the parties 
filed the following stipulation in regards to further testimony from Officer Provstgaard: 
When Mr. Dudley Rowley called me and told me about the things he had found in 
his son's truck, I directed him to leave them where he found them. Upon my 
arrival at Mr. & Mrs. Rowley's residence, I was escorted to the garage area, where 
the defendant's truck was parked, by Mr. Rowley. He showed me the syringe and 
the small porcelain cup with a white crystal substance in it, which were located in 
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an open shelf or cubby hole in the front of the dashboard. These items were in 
plain view from the outside of the truck, by looking through the driver's window 
(R. 58-57). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying Rowley's motion to suppress. Although the 
officer had probable cause that illegal drugs and paraphernalia were located in Rowley's 
truck because he had seen them through the driver's window from a place where his 
presence was lawful, he had no lawful authority to enter into the vehicle, and seize the 
contraband. 
Although the contraband could be seen in plain view from outside the vehicle, the 
officer did not have a legal justification for seizing and entering the truck and retrieving 
the items. One, it can't be justified by consent. Rowley's parents had no authority— 
actual or apparent—to consent to a seizure and search of the truck. Two, opening a car 
door and entering the vehicle constitutes a search under the federal and state 
constitutions. Under these circumstances, probable cause and exigent circumstances are 
required. In this case, there were no exigent circumstances accompanying the probable 
cause, which justified the warrantless entry, search and seizure of Rowley's truck. 
Accordingly the trial court erred in denying Rowley's motion to suppress. This 
court should reverse his conviction, remand the matter back to the Fourth District Court 
with instructions that his plea is to be withdrawn and the evidence suppressed. 
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ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ROWLEY'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF HIS TRUCK 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 14 of 
the Utah Constitution, protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
"Searches as seizures conducted without a warrant are 'unreasonable per se unless [they] 
fall[ ] within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth 
amendment/5' State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 226 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting State v. 
Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Utah App. 1989). Moreover, u[d]epartures from the 
warrant requirement must be limited to 'a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.'" Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct 
507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). Such specific exceptions include: consent, protective 
sweeps, searches incident to arrest, searches of movable vehicles, and seizure of clearly 
incriminating evidence or contraband in plain view. See State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 
409, Tf 11, 131 P.3d 246, qff*d by 2007 UT 23,156 P.3d 795; State v. Grossi, 2003 UT 
App 181, \ 14, 72 P.3d 686, cert denied, 78 P.3d 987 (Utah 2003); Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 
at 226; and State v. Hygh, 111 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985). However, such warrantless 
activity must be accompanied by probable cause. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 226. 
Rowley filed a motion to suppress challenging the warrantless search of his 
vehicle under the federal and state constitutions (R. 50-43). Specifically, he argued that 
his parents lacked authority to consent to any search of his property, it was unreasonable 
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for police to believe that his parents had authority to consent to a search of his property, 
and there were no exigent circumstances present which could justify the search (Id.). The 
State argued that the search was supported by probable cause and the plain view 
exception to the warrant requirement (R. 66-63). 
Oral arguments were conducted on the motion (R. 80). Rowley argued that while 
the drugs were in plain view in the garage, and while his parents had consented to the 
officer's presence in the garage, the officer did not have permission to enter his truck and 
that a warrant was necessary in order for police to go inside the car under these 
circumstances (R. 80: 3, 86-83). In addition, Rowley argued that there were not exigent 
circumstances which could have justified a warrantless search of his vehicle: He was in 
jail. Police easily could have secured a warrant for a search of the vehicle (R. 80: 3-5). 
The trial court denied the motion (R. 80: 7). Specifically, the trial court concluded 
that the officer's presence in the garage was by voluntary consent of the home owners, 
and that "the 'plain view' discovery of the syringe and small porcelain cup with 
crystalline substance that was taken into custody by Deputy Provstgaard falls under the 
recognized exceptions to the requirement of a warrant under the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article One, Section Fourteen of the Utah State 
Constitution" (R. 84). Along with legal conclusions, the trial court made certain factual 
findings (R. 86-83). Rowley does not challenge those factual findings. Rowley also does 
not challenge the presence of probable cause. He concedes that "the facts and 
circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge... [are] sufficient in themselves to 
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warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being 
committed/5 State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted). 
Rowley asserts that the trial court's legal conclusion that the warrantless search of 
his truck was justified under the "plain view" exception is in error and should be 
corrected by this Court. The plain view exception applies to situations where the State 
can establish the following: One, that "the officer is lawfully present where the search ... 
occur[s]." Two, that "the evidence is in plain view." And three, that "the evidence is 
clearly incriminating." Grossi, 2003 UT App 181 at f 9 (quoting State v. Gallegos, 967 
P.2d 973, 976 (Utah App. 1998). 
Rowley concedes to the second and third factors. The parties stipulated following 
preliminary hearing that the evidence, which was found in his truck, was in plain view 
through the driver's side window from where Officer Provstgaard stood in the garage (R. 
58-57). In addition, it is indisputable that the syringe and the small porcelain cup with 
crystalline substance are incriminating. Nonetheless, Rowley argues that the plain view 
exception cannot justify the warrantless search of his truck because Officer Provstaard 
had no lawful basis for being in his truck where the search occurred. In this case, Officer 
Provstgaard had proper consent to be in the Rowley's garage. The homeowners, 
Rowley's parents, invited him there. However, Provstaard had no authority to enter into 
Rowley's truck and retrieve the contraband he had seen. 
Specifically, the trial court found in relationship to this issue: One, that the truck 
was registered in Rowley's name only and that he had owned it for 5-6 months prior to 
his arrest. Two, prior to being taken to jail, Rowley asked his father to take care of items 
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in the truck bed. Three, Rowley did not ask his parents to move the truck from the street, 
but his father, nonetheless, obtained the keys from Rowley's bedroom and moved the 
truck to the garage. Four, that Provstgaard opened the truck door, entered the truck, and 
took custody of the syringe, porcelain cup from inside and the digital scales from the bed 
of the truck1 (R. 86-84). 
In addition, Rowley asserts that Provstgaard knew that the truck belonged to him. 
Provstgaard testified to monitoring a phone conversation at the jail between Rowley and 
his parents, where the parents confronted Rowley about the contraband they had found in 
his truck (R. 27: 9). Moreover, he testified that he had been shown the registration for the 
truck in the dining room of the Rowley home (R. 27: 11-12). Provstgaard also testified 
that he never asked Rowley for consent to search the truck (R. 27: 11). 
Accordingly, the trial court erred in concluding that all the requirements for 
application of the plain view exception had been satisfied. The search occurred inside the 
truck. Officer Provstgaard had no lawful basis for being in the truck. That contraband 
was observed in plain view from outside the truck provides Provstgaard with probable 
cause, it does not, however, in and of itself, provide him with a lawful basis for entering 
the truck. 
1
 The digital scales were located inside a bag in the truck bed. They had been discovered by 
Rowley's mother and then put back where they were found at Provstgaard's request per 
telephone prior to his arrival at the residence. (R. 27: 6, 7-8,10). Accordingly, the scales were 
not in plain view although Provstaard knew they were inside the bag. 
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A. Rowley's parents lacked authority—actual or apparent—to consent to the search 
and seizure of his truck. 
Provstgaard's seizure and search of Rowley's truck cannot be justified by any 
consent by his parents. Rowley's parents did not have common authority over his truck 
such that they could give Provstgaard valid consent for him to enter and search the truck. 
"A warrantless search is reasonable if it is conducted with the consent of the defendant or 
some other person who 'possesse[s] common authority over or other sufficient 
relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.'" Duran, 2005 UT App 409 
at 111 (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 
242 (1974). A finding of common authority is dependent upon "mutual use of the 
property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it 
is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the 
inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their 
number might permit the common area to be searched." Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, n.7. 
"To possess the necessary common authority, the third party must have both 
shared use of the premises and joint access or control." Duran, 2005 UT App 409 at«[[ 11 
(citing United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 864 (10th Cir. 1992)). It in 
undisputable that the truck belonged solely to Rowley. His father had never driven it 
prior to moving it to the garage (R. 27:18). Rowley never requested that his father move 
the truck (R. 27: 7, 15; 85). His parents did not have "joint access" to the truck or 
"control for most purposes." They, therefore, had no right to permit Provstgaard to enter 
into and search the truck. See Duran, 2005 UT App 409 at \ 12 (no common authority 
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where there was no evidence that the consenting third party had shared use of a trailer, 
had a key to the trailer, or could enter when the renter was not present). 
Furthermore, it was unreasonable for Provstgaard to believe that Rowley's parents 
had apparent authority to consent to the search of the truck. "If the facts known to the 
officers would not cause a person of reasonable caution to conclude that the consenting 
party had authority over the premises, 'then warrantless entry without further inquiry is 
unlawful unless authority actually exists."' Duran, 2005 UT App 409 at ^ 14 (quoting 
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89, 110 S.Ct 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)). At 
the time of the warrantless search of Rowley's vehicle, Provstgaard knew that the truck 
belonged to Rowley. He had monitored a conversation at the jail between Rowley and 
his parents, and he had been shown the vehicle's registration. These facts alone, Rowley 
asserts, would not permit a person of reasonable caution to conclude that Rowley's 
parents had authority over the truck. 
In addition, the State cannot meet its burden of proving common authority "'if 
agents, faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless proceed without making further 
inquiry.'" Duran, 2005 UT App 409 at % 16 (quoting State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 533 
(Utah App. 1998)). Rowley asserts that there was no ambiguity concerning ownership 
and authority over his truck. However, even if Provstgaard was faced with an ambiguous 
situation concerning the authority of Rowley's parents to consent to a search of the truck, 
he had a duty not to proceed with the search without making further inquiry. There is no 
evidence that he made any such inquiry. If he had, he would have learned that Rowley 
had not asked his parents to move his truck from the street to the garage, that his father 
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had not driven the truck before that day, and that the parents did not have their own set of 
keys to the truck. Under these additional facts, Provstgaard certainly could not have 
believed that Rowley's parents had authority to consent to the search of the vehicle. 
B. The Warrantless Seizure and Search of Rowley's Vehicle was not Justified by 
Probable Cause and Exigent Circumstances. 
The opening of a vehicle to search for physical evidence as was done here, 
constitutes a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. State v. James, 2000 UT 80, ^ 9, 13 
P.3d 576; State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132, 1135-36 (Utah 1989). Probable cause alone 
does not justify the warrantless search of a residence or automobile. State v. Duran, 2007 
UT 23,16-7, 156 P.3d 795; State v. Maycock, 947 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah App. 1997). 
Exigent circumstances are also required. Id. 
While Rowley acknowledges that Provstgaard had probable cause, he asserts that 
there were no exigent circumstances which would justify the search of his vehicle 
without a warrant. Moreover, in this case it matters not whether the truck, which was 
parked inside a home garage, is classified as part of the residence or as simply a vehicle, 
exigent circumstances are still required before police could be relieved of the requirement 
of obtaining a search warrant prior to undertaking to search the truck. 
"Exigent circumstances are those that would cause a reasonable person to believe 
that entry was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the 
destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequences 
improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts." State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 
18 (Utah App. 1993) (additional quotations and citations omitted). In regards to a 
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vehicle, exigent circumstances exist "when the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, 
and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained." State v. 
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1237 (Utah 1996). However, in regards to circumstances 
where evidence might be destroyed or removed if a warrant were obtained, there must be 
more than "the 'mere possibility that evidence may be destroyed."5 State v. South, 885 
P.2d 795, 800 (Utah App. 1994), rev yd on other grounds, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996). 
Rather, police officers must have a reasonable belief that the destruction of evidence is 
sufficiently certain as to justify a warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances." 
State v. Duran, 2007 UT 23,1 8, 156 P.3d 795. 
Rowley asserts that none of these situations, which would establish exigent 
circumstances, were present here. There was nothing that would cause a reasonable 
person to believe that entry into the vehicle was necessary to prevent physical harm. 
While the car was movable and Rowley had been alerted by his parents of their discovery 
of contraband in his truck, he was in jail and the truck had been moved into his parents' 
garage. There was no danger under these circumstances of the evidence being destroyed 
or moved if a warrant was obtained. Moreover, his parents were the ones who secured 
the truck inside their garage, discovered the drugs and paraphernalia and alerted police. 
Accordingly, no reasonable person could believe that they would move the evidence, 
destroy the evidence, or otherwise frustrate law enforcement efforts. See, State v. Duran, 
2007 UT 23, 156 P.3d 795 (Officers called to residence on report of current marijuana 
use and weapons in trailer on property. Officers smelled marijuana outside trailer. 
However, plain smell of burning marijuana does not qualify as exception to warrant 
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requirement for entry into trailer though does provide probable cause. Moreover, no 
exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into trailer where suspects were 
unaware of police presence and were taking no steps to destroy evidence other than by 
simply ingesting it). Cf. State v. Maycock, 947 P.2d 695, 697-98 (Utah App. 1997) 
(exigent circumstances where vehicle was movable, defendant was alerted, and 
contraband could have been disposed of had officer left to procure a warrant where 
officer could not avail himself of telephonic warrant procedure because he lacked 
telephone access to a magistrate and it was a holiday). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "Once the threat that the suspect will injure 
the officers with concealed weapons or will destroy evidence is gone, there is no 
persuasive reason why the officers cannot take the time to secure a warrant. Such a 
requirement would present little impediment to police investigations, especially in light 
of the ease with which warrants can be obtained under Utah's telephonic warrant 
statute...." State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990) (citations omitted). 
In this case, there was no persuasive reason why Provstgaard could not have 
secured a search warrant for Rowley's vehicle. Rowley was in jail. His truck was secure 
inside his parents' garage. His parents were cooperative. In addition, Provstgaard could 
have secured a warrant prior to going to the residence. He had monitored a conversation 
between Rowley and his parents concerning the drugs and paraphernalia found in the 
truck, and he had been contacted by Rowley's parents about the same items. In addition, 
apparently there was some discussion between the Sheriffs office and the county 
attorney's office about this matter prior to Provstgaard going to the residence (R. 27:11). 
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Moreover, Officer Provstgaard easily could have blocked entry into the garage for 
the time required to secure a warrant, with or without the consent of Rowley's parents, 
who almost certainly would have given consent. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 
331-33, 121 S.Ct. 946 (2001) (cited by State v. Duran, 2007 UT 23, f 16, 156 P.3d 795) 
(Officers who had probable cause of illegal drugs inside home and good cause to believe 
that suspect would destroy the evidence before they could obtain a warrant, were 
reasonable in preventing suspect from entering home and blocking entry into home for 
two-hour period it took to obtain search warraqnt). 
Accordingly, Rowley asserts that although there was probable cause to search his 
vehicle, there was no exigent circumstances as required for such a search without a 
warrant. Probable cause without exigent circumstances does not relieve police of the 
responsibility of securing a warrant prior to the search of a residence or vehicle. 
C. All evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search of Rowley's truck should be 
suppressed under the exclusionary rule. 
The exclusionary rule acts to suppress evidence illegally obtained. If a search or 
seizure violates the Fourth Amendment or Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution, any 
evidence obtained as a result of such illegality must be excluded. See State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991). Because Officer Provstgaard's warrantless search of 
Rowley's vehicle was unconstitutional, all evidence obtained by that search must be 
suppressed. See Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963). 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Rowley requests that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress and remand this case to the Fourth District Court for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of March, 2008. 
Margaret P.Cindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 25th day of March, 2008. 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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JEFFREY BUHMAN #7041 
Utah County Attorney 
Alexander M Ludlow #2009 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
(801)370-8026 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
BRANDON ROWLEY 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 061402245 
JUDGE: STEVEN L. HANSEN 
COMES NOW THE COURT, having been fully informed as to the relevant facts in this 
matter and hereby makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. After being arrested on May 24, 2006, Defendant, Brandon Rowley left his Chevrolet 
S-10 Pickup truck parked in front of his parents residence in Saratoga Springs, UT. 
2. Defendant's truck was registered in his name only and he had owned the truck for 5-6 
months prior to his arrest. 
3. Before being taken to jail, Defendant asked his father, Mr. Dudley Rowley to take care 
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of the things that were in the back of his truck. 
4. Defendant did not ask his parents to move the truck, but after defendant was taken to 
jail, Mr. Dudley Rowley obtained the keys from defendant's bedroom and moved the truck inside 
his garage at his residence to protect it from the weather. 
5. While moving the truck, Mr. Dudley Rowley discovered a syringe and a small 
porcelain cup that had a crystalline substance in it, inside the pickup truck in an open cubby hole 
in the truck's dash. 
6. Thereafter, Mrs. Rowley, the defendant's mother found a digital scale in a bag located 
in the back bed of the pickup truck. 
7. Mr. and Mrs. Rowley informed the defendant of what they had found during a 
telephone conversation with him. After this telephone conversation, Mr. Rowley called Deputy 
Sheriff Story Provstgaard and reported finding the items. Deputy Provstgaard requested the 
Dudley's to put the items back where they had been found and then stated he would come to pick 
them up. 
8. Deputy Provstgaard went to the Rowley residence in Saratoga Springs and was 
accompanied to the garage area by Mr. Rowley, where defendant's truck was parked. 
9. Mr. Rowley showed Deputy Provstgaard the location of the syringe and the porcelain 
cup with the crystalline substance. Deputy Provstgaard could see these items from outside the 
truck. 
10. Deputy Provstgaard opened the truck door, entered the truck and took custody of the 
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syringe and porcelain cup with crystalline substance from the inside of the truck cab and the 
digital scales from the back bed of the truck. 
11. Mr. and Mrs. Rowley acted independently as private citizens and were at no time 
acting as agents of the Utah County Sheriffs office or any other law enforcement agency. 
12. Mr. and Mrs. Rowley gave voluntary consent for Deputy Sheriff Provstgaard to enter 
their garage, where defendant's truck was parked. 
13. The syringe and small porcelain cup with the crystalline substance were located in 
the plain view of Deputy Sheriff Provstgaard from a place he was entitled to be. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The syringe, the small porcelain cup with crystalline substance and the digital scales 
discovered by Mr. and Mrs. Rowley, as private citizens, does not fall within the scope of the 
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure contained in the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution or Article One, Section Fourteen of the Utah State Constitution. 
2. The presence of Deputy Sheriff Provstgaard in Mr. and Mrs. Rowley's garage was 
occasioned by voluntary consent and thus is outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article One, Section Fourteen of the Utah State Constitution. 
3. The "plain view" discovery of the syringe and small procelain cup with crystalline 
substance that was taken into custody by Deputy Provstgaard falls under the recognized 
exceptions to the requirement of a warrant under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article One, Section Fourteen of the Utah State Constitution 
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4. Therefore, there was no violation of defendant's rights against unreasonable search 
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article One, 
Section Fourteen of the Utah State Constitution, 
ORDER 
The defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby DENIED. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and accurate copy of the foregoing document to 
Gunda Jarvis, Utah County Public Defender Association, 51 South University Ave., Suite 206, 
Provo, Utah 84601, on April 3, 2007. 
GUNDA JARVIS (8503) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorneys for Defendant 
51 South University Avenue, Suite 206 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 852-1070 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN 
Plaintiff, SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
v. 
Case No. 061402245 
BRANDON ROWLEY, 
Defendant. Hon. Judge Steven L. Hansen 
BRANDON ROWLEY, Defendant, by and through counsel, GUNDA JARVIS, hereby 
moves this court to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article One, Section 
Fourteen of the Utah State Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On May 24, 2006, Mrs. Dudley Rowley called her son Brandon's probation officer to 
have him arrested. P.H. at 5. Brandon's truck, a Chevrolet S-10 pickup, was parked in front of 
the Rowley residence when Brandon was arrested. Id. at 5, 7, 14. Mr. Dudley Rowley, 
Brandon's father, was not sure whether Brandon's truck was locked or not, but Brandon 
remembered that his truck was locked. Id. at 7, 15. Brandon has owned the track for five to six 
months. Id. at 14. The truck is registered and the truck's title is in Brandon's name. Id. at 14-
15. 
1
 The facts are taken from the Preliminary Hearing C'P.H"). _ ^ 
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Before going to jail, Brandon asked Mr. Rowley to take care of the things that were in the 
back of his truck. Id. at 5, 7, 14. Brandon did not ask his father to move his truck. Id. at 7, 15. 
No one had permission to move his truck. Id. at 15. Brandon did not give Mr. Rowley the keys 
to his truck. Id. at 15. There was a set of keys to the truck in the room Brandon was staying in 
at the Rowley home. Id. at 17. 
Mr. Rowley does not remember whether he retrieved the keys from Brandon's bedroom 
or if Brandon gave him a set of keys before he left. Id. at 18. After retrieving the keys, Mr. 
Rowley pulled his own car out of the garage and drove Brandon's truck into it to protect items 
that were in the pickup bed from the weather. Id. at 5. Mr. Rowley had never driven the truck 
before that day. Id. at 18. As he drove it into the garage, he noticed some items in an open 
cubby hole in the truck's dash. Id. at 5-6. Mr. Rowley found a sj/ringe and a small little 
porcelain cup. Id. at 6. He showed these items to his wife. Id. a1 6. Mrs. Rowley went through 
items in the back bed of Brandon's pickup, opened up Brandon's bag, and found a digital scale. 
Id. at 6. 
Sometime later, Brandon called his parents from jail. Id. ait 18. Mr. Rowley told Brandon 
about the items he and Mrs. Rowley found in the truck. Id. at 9-10, 18. Mr. Rowley also called 
Deputy Story Provstgaard and told him about the items. Id. at 9-10. Mr. Rowley knew Deputy 
Provstgaard because Provstgaard was investigating a different case involving a theft of some of 
the Rowley's property. Id, at 9. Deputy Provstgaard told Mr. Rowley he would come to retrieve 
the items and to leave them where they were found. Id, at 10. 
Provstgaard did not ask Brandon whether he could search his truck. Id. at 11. Instead, he 
called the County Attorney's office to brief them on the situation. Id, at 11. Sergeant Brower felt 
that Deputy Provstgaard had enough information to proceed with a warrantless search. Id. at 11. 
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Provstgaard went to the Rowley residence and retrieved the items from the truck that Mr. and 
Mrs. Rowley had found. Id. at 12. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Officer Provstgaard's Search of Brandon's Truck Was Illegal Because He Unreasonably 
Relied On Mr. and Mrs. Rowley's Third-Party Consent. 
Because Brandon's Rowley's parents did not have common authority over his truck, their 
consent to Officer Provstgaard's request to search it was invalid. The Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. Likewise, the Utah Constitution holds that: "The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized." 
Utah Const, art. 1, sec. 14. Thus, "[warrantless searches are per se unreasonable" and violate the 
Fourth Amendment. State v. Rynhart, 2005 UT 84, \ 19, 125 P.3d 938 {quoting State v. Brown, 
853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992)). However, a warrantless search is reasonable with valid consent 
from the defendant or another third party. State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, f 11, 131 P.3d 246. 
In this case, Dudley Rowley's consent to search Brandon's truck was invalid. Accordingly, 
Officer Provstgaard's search violated Brandon's Fourth Amendment rights. 
A. Mr. and Mrs. Rowley Did Not Have Common Authority Over Brandon's Truck To 
Authorize A Warrantless Search. 
Warrantless searches are reasonable with consent from either the defendant or some other 
person who "possesse[s] common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or 
effects sought to be inspected." State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409,111,131 P.3d 246 {quoting 
3
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U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)). One has common authority over another's property if 
they have both (1) shared use of the premises and (2) joint access or control. Duran, 2005 UT 
App 409, f 11 (citing U.S. v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 864 (10th Cir. 1992)). Common 
authority focuses on the mutual use of the property by the defendant and the third-party, so that 
each can permit access "in their own right" and each "have assumed the risk" that the others 
might permit the search. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, lj 11; Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, n7. More 
clearly, common authority is not implied from the third party's property interest but his or her 
right of possession. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, ^ 15 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7) (citing 
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992)). "The State bears the burden of proving common 
authority, and it must do so by a preponderance of the evidence." Brown, 853 P.2d at 855. 
There is no indication that Mr. and Mrs. Rowley had common authority over Brandon's 
truck. Both Mr. Rowley and Brandon testified that the truck was Brandon's. P.H. at 7, 14. 
Brandon had bought it himself, owned it for five to six months, and held title to it. P.H. at 6, 14, 
15. Also, Brandon had not asked Mr. Rowley to move his truck nor did anyone have permission 
to move it. P.H. at 15. In fact, Mr. Rowley had not driven Brandon's truck before the day of the 
incident where it was parked on the street. P.H. at 7, 15, 18. Finally, Brandon testified that he 
had not given the truck keys to his father and Mr. Rowley confirmed that he either obtained keys 
to the truck when Brandon gave them as he was being arrested or when Mr. Rowley retrieved a 
set that were in Brandon's bedroom. P.H. at 15, 17, 18. Thus, where Officer Provstgaard entered 
Brandon's track without a warrant and without an exception to the warrant requirement, his entry 
violated Brandon's Fourth Amendment rights. See State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, f 12, 131 
P.3d 246 (no common authority where there was no evidence that the consenting third party had 
shared use of the camp trailer, had a key to the trailer, or would enter it when defendant was not 
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present). 
B. It Was Unreasonable For Officer Provstgaard To Believe That Mr. And Mrs. Rowley 
Had Apparent Authority Over Brandon's Truck Absent Inquiry. 
Any Fourth Amendment search must be objectively reasonable under the facts of that 
particular case. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, If 14, State v. Earl, 2004 UT App 163, \ 21, 92 P.3d 
167 {citingIllinois v. Rodriquez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990)). Thus, even though after the fact an 
officer may have mistakenly assumed a third-party had the apparent authority to consent to a 
search, the search is lawful if would cause a person of reasonable caution to conclude that the 
third party had authority over the property. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, f^ 14 (citing Rodriquez, 
497 U.S. at 188-89). However, if a reasonable person knowing the facts available at the time to 
the officers would conclude that the third-party did not have common authority, then a 
warrantless search is unreasonable absent a reasonable inquiry into the third party's mutual use of 
the property. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, \ 14-15; State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 533 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). Put simply, one cannot establish common authority "'if [agents], faced with an 
ambiguous situation, nevertheless proceed without making further inquiry.'" Davis, 965 P.2d at 
533 (quoting US v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1991)) (additional citations 
omitted). 
At the time of Officer Provstgaard's warrantless search, he knew Mr. and Mrs. Rowley 
had found the items in Brandon's truck. P.H. at 10. Officer Provstgaard did not ask Mr. or Mrs. 
Rowley questions that would indicate whether they had shared use of the truck and joint access or 
control. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, ^ f 11. Had Officer Provstgaard asked questions, he would 
have learned that Mr. Rowley had not driven Brandon's truck before that day (P.H. at 7, 15,18) 
and that Mr. Rowley did not have his own set of keys but rather obtained keys to the truck when 
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either Brandon gave them as he was being arrested or when Mr. Rowley retrieved a set that were 
in Brandon's bedroom. P.H. at 15, 17, 18. Knowing these facts, Officer Provstgaard could not 
have reasonably belied that Mr. and Mrs. Rowley had authority to consent. See State v. Elder, 
815 P.2d 1341, 1344-45 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that officers could not reasonably 
believe that sister had authority to consent to search where sister's husband had to kick in locked 
door of crawl space). Rather, Officer Provstgaard, faced with an ambiguous situation, solely 
focused on what the Rowley's had found. See Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 533 (stating that the State's 
burden to prove common authority cannot be met "if agents, faced with an ambiguous situation, 
nevertheless proceed without making further inquiry") (additional citations omitted). 
II. Even If Officer Provstgaard Had Reasonably Relied On the Rowley's Consent, There 
Were No Exigent Circumstances To Justify His Warrantless Search. 
"[Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under both the state and federal 
constitutions.'" State v. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198, ^ [8, 93 P.3d 854 {quoting State v. Morck, 
821 P.2d 1190, 1192-93 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). "One such exception to the warrant requirement 
recognized by both the United States Supreme Court and Utah's appellate courts is exigent 
circumstances." Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, \ 9, 994 P.2d 1283. "Exigent 
circumstances are those that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry was necessary 
to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the 
escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law 
enforcement efforts." State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 18 (Utah Co. App. 1993) (additional 
quotations and citations omitted). 
In this case, there was no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search of 
Brandon's truck. First, nothing about the situation indicated to Officer Provstgaard that there 
6
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were weapons inside Brandon's truck posing an immediate danger to safety. Second, there was 
no danger of the evidence being destroyed where Brandon was in custody at the time and the 
truck could have been locked to safekeep the evidence. The Utah Supreme Court has stated 
"[o]nce the threat that the suspect will injure the officers with concealed weapons or will destroy 
evidence is gone, there is no persuasive reason why the officers cannot take the time to secure a 
warrant. Such a requirement would present little impediment to police investigations, especially 
in light of the ease with which warrants can be obtained under Utah's telephonic warrant statute, 
U.C.A., 1953, §§ 77-23-4(2) (1982 ed.)." State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990) 
(citations omitted); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-203. In fact, Officer Provstgaard admits he 
did not ask Brandon for permission to search his truck, did not ask the County Attorney whether 
a warrant was needed, but relied on Seargant Brower's determination that he had adequate 
information to proceed. P.H. at 11. Because there were no exigent circumstances, the evidence 
must be suppressed. 
III. The Evidence Obtained As a Result of the Illegal Search of Brandon's Truck Should Be 
Suppressed. 
The exclusionary rule acts to suppress evidence illegally obtained. "If a seizure occurs 
and the police are unable to point to the specific and articulable facts that justified that seizure, 
the seizure violates the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, and evidence 
obtained as a result of the illegal seizure must be excluded." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 
(Utah 1991) (quoting U.S. v. Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968)). Officer Provstgaard illegally 
searched Brandon's truck without valid consent or exigent circumstances. During this unlawful 
search, Officer Provstgaard discovered evidence as a direct result. Under the exclusionary rule, 
this evidence must be suppressed. See e.g., Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should grant Brandon Rowley's Motion to Suppress because his warrantless 
search was unconstitutional. Mr. and Mrs. Rowley did not have common authority to consent to 
the search of Brandon's track and Officer Provstgaard unreasonably relied upon that authority 
without making further inquiry into the Rowley's mutual use of Brandon's truck. Furthermore, 
no exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless search where Officer Provstgaard 
could have secured a search warrant. Therefore, this Court should grant the Motion to Suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this * day of November, 2006. 
Gunda Jawis 
Attorney for Defendant 
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JEFFBUHMAN # 7041 
Utah County Attorney 
Alexander Ludlow #2009 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo,UT 84606 
Telephone: (801)851-8026 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRANDON ROWLEY, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
CASE NO. 061402245 
JUDGE STEVEN L. HANSEN 
FACTS 
The State accepts the facts as set forth by the defense in their Motion to Suppress, with 
the following addition, which is contained in the Stipulation of the parties, as previously filed 
with the court: 
When Mr. Dudley Rowley called Deputy Sheriff Jory Provstgaard to report the items 
found in defendant's truck, Deputy Provstgaard directed Mr. Rowley to leave the items where he 
had found them. Deputy Provstgaard then went to the residence of Mr. Rowley and was escorted 
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to the garage by Mr. Rowley, where defendant's truck was parked Mr. Rowley showed Deputy 
Provstgaard the syringe with residue and the small white porcelain cup which contained a 
crystalline substance. These items were located in an open shelf or cubby hole in the front dash 
board of the truck. These items were in plain view by Deputy Provstgaard from the outside of 
the truck. 
ISSUE 
Was the search conducted by Deputy Sheriff Provstgaard, which yielded the evidence 
supporting the charges against the defendant, an illegal search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of the Utah? 
LAW 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the 
Constitution of Utah each provide the right against unreasonable search and seizure. It does 
allow searches and seizures which are conducted by warrants that have been issued based upon 
probable cause. In addition, there are other types of searches that have been held reasonable, 
even though they are conducted without a warrant. One such exception is when the search is 
conducted by private citizens. In State of Utah v. Watts, 750 P. 2nd 1219 (1988) the Utah 
Supreme Court reiterated this long held principle when it said, "The fourth amendment 
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures protects only against governmental actions 
and does not extend to the independent acts of private citizens." (See also Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.ED.2nd 564; State v. Newbold, 581 P 2nd 991 
(Utah 1972)). Additionally, the party which is objecting to the evidence has the burden of 
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establishing the governmental involvement in a private search. {State v. Watts, 750 P. 2n 1219 
(1988) 
Another well established exception to the requirement of a warrant concerns objects that 
are viewed by an officer in plain view. InState v. Lee, 633 P. 2nd 48 (1981), the Supreme Court 
of Utah stated that, "Objects falling within plain view of officer from position where he is 
entitled to be are not subject of unlawful search;" (See also, State v. Cole 61A P. 2nd 119 (1983), 
where the Utah Supreme Court again stated, "Objects within the plain view of an officer in a 
position where he is entitled to be are not the subject of an unlawful search."; also, Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. at 351.) 
APPLICATION OF LAW 
In the present case, defendant's truck was initially searched by his father, who was acting 
in a private capacity. There has been no evidence presented or argued by defendant that Mr. 
Dudley Rowley was acting in behalf or in concert with law enforcement officials when he 
conducted the search of defendant's truck while moving it into his garage for safekeeping. 
Therefore, the initial discovery of the contraband is not prohibited by the doctrine against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Mr. Rowley then contacted Deputy Provstgaard and reported what he had found. Mr. 
Rowley was advised to leave the items where he had discovered them. With this information as 
probable cause, Deputy Provstgaard went to Mr. Dudley Rowley's residence. He was given 
permission to go into the garage, and in fact, was invited into and escorted there by Mr. Rowley. 
He then pointed out to Deputy Provstgaard the items he had found. Deputy Provstgaard 
distinctly stated that the syringe and the cup with the substance (that later tested positive for 
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methamphetamine) was in plain view from outside the truck, through the window. This is a 
classic example of an officer being in a place where he is lawfully entitled to be and observing 
(as any reasonable person could) the items of contraband. The fact that they were being pointed 
out by Mr. Rowley does not deter from that fact that this was a plain view search. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the court, based upon the above facts and application of 
law, to deny Defendant's motion to suppress the search of defendant's truck conducted by 
Deputy Sheriff Provstgaard. 
DATED AND SIGNED this 20th day of February, 2007. 
ALEXANDER LUDLOW 
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
QOQQ6* 
